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A Potential Conflict In 
Auditing And Legal Standards
By Danny L. Kennett and William J. Radig
The independent auditor’s duty to disclose 
management misconduct to third parties is an 
extremely sensitive area involving both auditing 
standards and legal standards of conduct. It has 
been generally argued that the auditor’s duty to 
disclose ended when the auditor notified the client 
of management misconduct and subsequently 
withdrew or disassociated himself or herself from 
the client [Chazen, Miller, and Solomon, pp. 66- 
70]. Proponents of this argument contend that 
silent withdrawal is a privilege of the 
auditor/client relationship and is necessary 
because of the auditor’s unique relationship 
between a client and the public. Moreover, it has 
been pointed out that there is no basis in generally 
accepted auditing standards or legal theory to 
suggest that anything other than silent 
withdrawal is appropriate. While, under certain 
circumstances, the auditor may be legally justified 
in disclosing misconduct to third parties, the 
auditor is not legally obligated to blow the whistle.
SAS No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to 
Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities, one of 
the “expectation gap” pronouncements, generally 
endorses the silent withdrawal argument. It states, 
in part [paragraph 29]:
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Disclosure of irregularities to 
parties other than the client’s 
senior management and its 
audit committee or board of 
directors is not ordinarily part 
of the auditor’s responsibility, 
and would be precluded by the 
auditor’s ethical or legal 
obligation of confidentiality 
unless the matter affects his 
opinion on the financial 
statements. The auditor should
. . . there is no basis in 
generally accepted 
auditing standards or 
legal theory to suggest 




recognize, however, that in the 
following circumstances a duty 
to disclose outside the client 
may exist:
a. When the entity reports an 
auditor change under the 
appropriate securities law 
on Form 8-K
b. To a successor audit or 
when the successor makes 
inquiries in accordance with 
SAS No. 7, . . .
c. In response to a subpoena
d. To a funding agency or 
other specified agency in 
accordance with 
requirements for the audits 
of entities that receive 
financial assistance from a 
government agency
Because potential conflicts with 
the auditor’s ethical and legal 
obligations for confidentiality 
may be complex, the auditor 
may wish to consult with legal 
counsel before discussing 
irregularities with parties 
outside the client.
The Statement clearly proscribes 
disclosures to third parties other 
than those specifically mentioned 
and cautions the auditor to consult 
legal counsel prior to notification of 
such parties. In short, unless 
otherwise directed by auditing 
standards, the auditor should 
remain silent upon withdrawal. 
Apparently, this policy is required, 
in part, by the auditor’s “legal 
obligation of confidentiality.”
Nevertheless, the auditor may, 
under certain circumstances, have 
a legal obligation to disclose 
management misconduct to third 
parties other than those specified in 
SAS No. 53. Causey [1986, p. 1-11] 
notes that a “relatively new line of 
court decisions is moving 
accountants and other professionals 
to a standard of conduct involving 
mandatory disclosure of client 
misconduct." Accordingly, he 
cautions [p. 7-5]: “Where the CPA 
learns that the client is misleading 
or attempting to mislead others, the 
CPA should consult legal counsel as 
to whether the factual setting 
permits withdrawal in silence.”
Emerging Legal Standard 
of Conduct
Although SAS No. 53 is 
authoritative and provides explicit 
guidance concerning silent 
withdrawal stemming from 
management misconduct, its 
comfort may be more apparent 
than real. While courts consider a 
profession’s accepted standard of 
conduct, they clearly are not bound 
formally or informally by that 
standard. Moreover, common law is 
subject to modification, revision, 
interpretation, and rejection by 
courts over time. Consequently, 
auditors should be aware of 
emerging legal standards of 
conduct that may conflict with or 
extend the profession’s standards.
Tarasoff v. Regents of University 
of California and Fund of Funds, 
Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. are 
two cases in the “relatively new line 
of court decisions” Causey notes. In 
Tarasoff, a psychotherapist, during 
therapy, was informed by a patient 
of his intent to murder a person 
whose identity was readily
While courts consider 
a profession's 
accepted standard of 
conduct, they clearly 
are not bound 
formally or 
informally by that 
standard.
determinable. The victim was not 
warned, and the threat was carried 
out by the patient. The victim’s 
parents sued. The court noted the 
need for, and protection of, the 
confidential psychotherapist­
patient relationship. The court also 
noted the common law rule that one 
person does not have a duty to warn 
those endangered by another’s 
conduct except when the person 
stands in some special relationship 
to the perpetrator and/or the 
intended victim. However, the 
court held that the psychotherapist 
owed a higher legal duty to inform 
the victim of the imminent danger 
than to maintain the patient’s 
threats in confidence.
Causey also cites Fund of Funds 
in his discussion of recent court 
decisions, yet the implications of 
this case remain somewhat 
ambiguous because there was no 
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third party and the CPA firm was 
associated with materially 
misstated financials. The Fund of 
Funds case involves three parties: 
the King group of companies 
(King), Fund of Funds (FOF), and 
the CPA firm of Arthur Andersen 
& Co. (AA), who was the external 
auditor for both King and FOF. 
Briefly, FOF entered into an 
agreement with King, whereby 
King was to advise FOF on the 
purchase of oil and gas properties 
and sell such properties to FOF at 
“arm’s length” prices from its own 
inventory. However, King’s 
relationship was described 
in the minutes of a Board 
of Director’s meeting as 
‘essentially a discretionary 
account managed by [King]’ 
and by AA as a ‘quasi 
fiduciary’ duty to FOF.” [Fund 
of Funds, p. 1334]. In fact, 
King fraudulently sold oil and 
gas properties at inflated 
prices to FOF. AA detected 
the practice but did not qualify 
its reports on the financials 
of King or FOF nor inform 
FOF of the fraud. The 
court explained that 
failure to disclose material 
information may be a 
basis for fraud:
Non-disclosure of material 
information, or omissions to 
disclose matter necessary to 
make other representations 
not misleading, are also 
actionable under common law,
provided “there was a fiduciary 
relationship between the parties” or a 
duty of disclosure arising from a 
“relationship of trust and 
confidence” between the parties 
[citations omitted]. At a minimum, 
a claim of fraud for failure to 
disclose may be based on 
defendant’s knowledge that 
plaintiff was acting under a 
reasonable, mistaken belief with 
respect to a material fact [citations 
omitted] [Fund of Funds, pp. 
1359 and 60].
The court held that AA failed to 
disclose King’s fraud to FOF 
“despite a professional duty and an 
express contractual obligation to do 
so.” [Fund of Funds, p. 1360] AA’s 
engagement letter to FOF provided 
that “any irregularities coming to 
our attention would be reported to 
you immediately" [Fund of Funds, 
p. 1327]. The court also rejected 
AA’s claim that its knowledge of 
King’s activities was confidential 
information. Even if the 
information was confidential, the 
court, citing expert testimony, 
noted that appropriate action by 
necessary disclosure; (2) disclose 
that it has relevant information not 
available to the other client; or (3) 
resign from one account” [Fund of 
Funds, p. 1361]
First Fed. Sav. & Loan v. 
Oppenheim, Appel. Dixon
Does the auditor have a duty to 
warn the victims if there is 
imminent danger of financial loss 
to known third parties? Although 
First Federal does not establish 
precedent, it clearly reveals the 
court’s predisposition to enforce a 
mandatory disclosure standard for 
CPAs who become aware of 
client misconduct. It is also 
a vivid example of the risks 
assumed by a CPA who does 
not consult legal counsel when 
management misconduct is 
known. The factual setting 
in First Federal is 
remarkably similar to 




relationships and third 
party victims. In First 
Federal, the auditors 
were informed by 
their audit client, 
Comark, that its 
customer-owned securities, 
entrusted to Comark for 
safekeeping, were comingled 
with its own securities in an 
account controlled by and pledged 
to Comark’s bank/clearing agent for 
overnight loans. The auditors knew 
that Comark was technically 
insolvent and that the overnight 
loan balance exceeded the value of 
Comark-owned securities. Both 
problems — the financial difficulties 
of Comark and the comingling of 
securities — were known by the 
auditors approximately a year 
prior to Comark’s collapse. When
Comark informed its bank of both 
problems, the bank immediately
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It is obvious that 
CPAs should consult 
their own legal 
counsel to determine if 
the factual setting 
permits withdrawal 
in silence.
foreclosed on the loan and 
liquidated all securities held in 
the pledged account. This event 
occurred approximately five 
months after Comark’s year-end. 
However, financial statements, 
at least statements with which 
the auditors were associated, 
were never issued.
Plaintiffs — customers who lost 
their securities entrusted to 
Comark for safekeeping — alleged 
two negligent misrepresentations 
by the auditors. First, with 
knowledge to the contrary the 
partner-in-charge verbally assured 
a Comark salesperson that there 
should be no problem with the 
year-end financials.
Second, customer-owned 
securities held in “safekeeping” by 
Comark were confirmed directly 
with the customers in two separate 
mailings as part of the year-end 
audit procedures. Customers were 
requested to “please confirm 
directly to our auditors . . that the 
attached statements are a complete 
and accurate record of . . . all 
securities we are holding for you in 
safekeeping,” which the courts 
viewed as “impliedly, but 
effectively representing that the 
writer or sender believes the 
securitiese are indeed being held in 
safekeeping” [First Federal p. 
436]. Plaintiffs argued the 
confirmations were “affirmative 
negligent misstatements of fact” by 
the auditors rather than a failure to 
disclose certain facts.
The oral misrepresentation had 
little, if any, effect on the court’s 
decision. The second alleged 
misrepresentation formed the crux 
of the case. The court held: 
“Certainly, once [the CPA firm] 
communicated with the plaintiffs, 
it owed them a duty to speak 
truthfully” [First Federal, p. 435]. 
In addition, the First Federal court 
[p. 434] held that the confirmations 
were “financial reports” in 
applying the Credit Alliance 
criteria. Under a complex web of 
legal theories, the auditors were 
successfully sued for violations of 
RICO, common law negligence, and 
common law fraud.
Could liability have been avoided 
if the auditors had withdrawn from 
the engagement in silence before 
direct confirmations were mailed to 
the customers? The court did not 
have to address this question, nor 
did it have to address the auditor’s 
defense that they owed a “higher 
legal duty” not to disclose 
detrimental information obtained 
in the confidential auditor-client 
relationship. Nevertheless, the 
court chose to comment on the 
confidentiality issue. Its comment 
makes it clear that in the court’s 
view, it was the auditor’s duty to 
disclose at some point in time prior 
to the direct confirmations.
It should be noted moreover that 
given the allegations of [the 
auditor’s] awareness of Comark’s 
insolvency, Comark’s fraudulent 
hypothecation of its customers’ 
securities, and the immediate 
danger of devastating financial 
losses plaintiffs risked by 
continued association with Comark, 
[the auditors] may well have had a 
duty to disclose. It is an accepted 
proposition in the area of common 
law fraud that a claim for deceit 
based on a failure to disclose may 
be based on a defendant’s
Does the auditor have 
a duty to warn the 
victims if there is 
imminent danger of 
financial loss to 
known third parties?
knowledge that a plaintiff was 
acting under a reasonable, 
mistaken belief with respect to a 
material fact (citations omitted) 
[First Federal, p. 435, note 7].
Immediate danger and imminent 
danger, like other legal and 
auditing concepts, defy precise 
definition. In First Federal, 
Comark’s severe financial 
difficulties, unless corrected, 
assured third party losses: either 
the customers would lose their 
securities or Comark would default 
on its loan.
There is one final aspect of this 
case that merits mention. The CPA 
firm was clearly aware of a legal 
hazard. However,instead of 
consulting their legal counsel, they 
consulted and apparently relied 
upon the advice of Comark’s 
counsel. Subsequently,the CPA 
firm brought suit against Comark’s 
legal counsel [First Fed. Sav. & 
Loan v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon, 
634 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)]. 
This action is still unresolved.
Summary and Conclusions
New auditing standards and 
emerging legal standards of 
conduct may be on a collision 
course regarding withdrawal in 
silence when management 
misconduct is involved. SAS No. 53 
categorically states that disclosure 
to outside parties “would be 
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precluded by the auditor’s ethical 
or legal obligations of 
confidentiality” unless the auditor 
is associated with financial 
statements and other specific 
circumstances. In contrast, a 
relatively new line of court 
decisions suggests that auditors 
may have an affirmative duty to 
disclose client misconduct when 
identifiable third parties are in 
imminent or immediate danger of 
devastating financial loss.
It is obvious that CPAs should 
consult their own legal counsel to 
determine if the factual setting 
permits withdrawal in silence. 
First Federal also demonstrates 
that CPAs should consult their own 
legal counsel before 
communicating either directly or 
indirectly with third parties who 
are or may be affected by 
management misconduct.
SAS No. 53 may have little 
impact on the profession, other 
than to raise a flag of caution. 
Auditors who find themselves 
pondering their duty to disclose 
management misconduct will be 
influenced more by the advice of
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their attorneys than by advice 
offered in the professional 
standards. Perhaps this is the way 
it should be in the matters of errors 
and irregularities, since litigation 
is both probable and prevalent in 
such matters.
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